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Abstract
This paper synthesizes confirmation by instances and confirmation by
successful predictions, and thereby the Hempelian and the hypothetico-
deductive traditions in confirmation theory. The merger of these two
approaches is subsequently extended to the piecemeal confirmation of en-
tire theories. It is then argued that this synthetic account makes a useful
contribution from both a historical and a systematic perspective.
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1. Introduction
There are two grand tradition in qualitative confirmation theory: hypothetico-
deductive (H-D) confirmation and confirmation by instances, usually linked to
the name of Carl G. Hempel. However, both the classical H-D account and
Hempel’s confirmation by instances have severe shortcomings, as has been noted
a number of times (Glymour 1980a,b; Gemes 1998). These problems were partly
addressed by the efforts of Glymour (1980a), Schurz (1991) and Gemes (1993),
but their resolutions of these difficulties came at the expense of simplicity and
transparency. For instance, the perhaps best game in town (Gemes 1993) rela-
tivizes the confirmation relation to the ‘natural axiomatization’ of a theory.
Therefore, this paper has two principal aims: First, it is shown that the basic
Hempelian and H-D intuitions can be synthesized into a single (albeit restric-
tive) account, which may be regarded as the ‘core’ of qualitative confirmation.
Notably, the logical formalism required for the synthesis is very parsimonious.
The two traditions might thus be closer to each other than previously thought,
in particular by Hempel himself. Second, it is shown that the synthetic account
circumvents the standard objections to H-D and instance confirmation, gets
the paradigmatic examples right and can be extended to the confirmation of
entire theories. Thus, the synthesis is interesting from both a historical and a
systematic perspective.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 gives a brief motivation of
qualitative confirmation theory vis-a`-vis quantitative approaches. Section 3
presents H-D and instance confirmation, as well as their problems. Section 4
introduces the principal technical tool of the paper – Ken Gemes’ content parts.
Section 5 uses content parts to synthesize Hempelian and H-D confirmation,
whereas Section 6 extends the definition to the confirmation of entire theories.
Section 7 discusses the synthetic account and concludes.
2. Why I am not Always a Bayesian
As of today, purely qualitative, syntactic accounts of confirmation have largely
been superseded by quantitative accounts such as Bayesianism. Therefore, I
consider it necessary to devote some lines to motivating the pursuit of a quali-
tative confirmation criterion.
There is a popular prejudice that with the advent and success of Bayesianism,
the study of the qualitative dimension of confirmation has become obsolete.
Bayesians model the beliefs of scientists by means of probability functions, and
explicate degree of confirmation as the credibility boost that a tested hypothesis
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experiences in the face of the evidence. This seems to be a comprehensive model
of learning from experience that subsumes qualitative accounts as special cases.1
Being a Bayesian myself, I do not want to question the merits of Bayesian
induction. However, it can hardly claim to be complete theory of confirmation in
science. Sure, since modern science comes with a strong focus on data analysis
and statistical inference, it lends itself naturally to a Bayesian analysis. But
the rival frequentist account provides a serious alternative that casts doubt on
subjective probability as a universal model for learning from experience. In
addition, many Bayesian practitioners do not treat prior probabilities as an
expression of their subjective uncertainty, as Bayesian theory would demand
(Gelman and Shalizi 2011).
What is more, it may be questioned whether increase of degree of belief is
a good explicatum for confirmation in strictly deterministic contexts. Think of
Kepler’s laws and Tycho Brahe’s observations of the orbit of Mars, or Lavoisier’s
refutation of the phlogiston theory in his experiments on combustion. In these
and similar cases, Bayesianism is, rather than an explication of scientific confir-
mation, an instrument to measure its extent. It does not describe the structure
of argument in the physical sciences up to the 19th century, precisely because
these arguments were usually non-probabilistic. Also, the subjective Bayesian
account fails to explain why the outcomes of some scientific experiments are
regarded as intersubjectively compelling evidence for a theory (Glymour 1980a,
93). From a Bayesian point of view, any posterior could be justified by choosing
appropriate priors.
These problems are not unique to Bayesianism. Basically, all quantitative
approaches to confirmation that are based on describing subjective epistemic at-
titudes under uncertainty (e.g., Dempster-Shafer theory, ranking functions) are
vulnerable to the same objections. If we are interested in what scientists (and
historians of science) refer to when talking about structural relations between
theory and evidence, a different approach is required. It is here that a qual-
itative study of logical relations between theory and evidence can supplement
quantitative confirmation theory in an important respect.
Among the qualitative approaches to confirmation, there are two grand tra-
ditions. One prominent proposal has been made by William Whewell:
Our hypotheses ought to foretel phenomena which have not yet been
observed [. . . ] the truth and accuracy of these predictions were a
1See Kuipers (2000) for an extended discussion of qualitative vs. Bayesian confirmation
theory.
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proof that the hypothesis was valuable and, at least to a great extent,
true. (Whewell 1847, 62-63)
Modeling empirical support by successful (deductive) prediction is the bottom
line of the hypothetico-deductive (H-D) model of confirmation. From the hypoth-
esis under test and some auxiliary assumptions, we derive empirical predictions
that confirm, if verified, the original hypothesis. For instance, a physicist will
test the harmonic oscillator model captured by the equation x¨ + ω2x = 0 for
swinging pendula by deriving its consequences for a particular pendulum. If
the predictions of the oscillator model are verified, they confirm the harmonic
oscillator model, if not, they refute it.
Moreover, the H-D model resembles the ‘conjectures and refutations’-model
of scientific progress (Popper 1934/71): hypotheses have to be subjected to
severe tests in order to gain corroboration. This fact distinguishes it among all
qualitative accounts of confirmation. It is thereby an attractive model for those
who are reluctant to assign degrees of belief in the truth of a scientific hypothesis
(a presumption of Bayesianism) but who believe that by subjecting a hypothesis
to severe tests and failing to observe refutations, it can be corroborated and
favored over others. H-D confirmation may be regarded as the non-probabilistic
counterpart of those philosophies of inductive learning that emphasize severe
testing of statistical hypotheses (e.g., Mayo 1996) vs. subjective belief updating.
For these reasons, it still deserves the attention of philosophers of science.
3. H-D vs. Hempelian Confirmation
Classical formulations of H-D confirmation such as
(H-D) Evidence E H-D confirms hypothesis H relative to back-
ground knowledge K if and only if (1) H.K is consistent, (2) H.K
entails E and (3) K alone does not entail E.
have several substantial shortcomings. First, we often want to say that the
results of a scientific experiment do not only support an isolated hypothesis,
but speak in favor of an entire theory consisting of several interrelated models
or theories (e.g., Dietrich and Moretti 2005). (H-D) does not specify how entire
theories, or major parts thereof, are confirmed, as opposed to the confirmation
of single hypotheses. Second, (H-D) is unable to cope with the so-called tacking
paradoxes. It is possible to tack irrelevant disjunctions to the evidence E and
to preserve the confirmation relation: If E confirms a hypothesis H relative to
K, E ∨ E′ confirms the same H for an arbitrary E′, relative to K. So, the
4
predictions of the harmonic oscillator model about a swinging pendulum or the
observation of a single black raven would confirm that swinging pendula are
harmonic oscillators.
This objection exploits the fact that any logical consequence of H, however
partial it is, still counts as a prediction of H and thus confirms it. In other words,
classical H-D confirmation gives no account of evidential relevance. A similar
problem already troubled Hempel in his ‘Studies in the Logic of Confirmation’
(Hempel 1945/65). Hempel discusses various adequacy criteria for qualitative
confirmation and also considers the
Converse Consequence Condition (CCC): If E confirms H and
H ′ entails H, then E also confirms H ′.
Taking the example E = H = ‘a is a raven’ and H ′ = ‘Hooke’s law holds
and a is a raven’, Hempel observes first that E confirms H according to what
he calls the Entailment Condition and concludes: ‘here, the rule that whatever
confirms a given hypothesis also confirms any stronger hypothesis becomes an
entirely absurd principle’ (Hempel 1945/65, 32–33). Formally, this is the flip
side of the problem of irrelevant disjunctions: namely the possibility of tacking
irrelevant conjunctions to the confirmed hypothesis H. That is, if E confirms
H relative to K, then E also confirms H.X for any X such that H.X 6 |=E and
{H,X,K} is a consistent set of propositions.
Since CCC invites to such irrelevant conjunctions, Hempel rejects the prin-
ciple and the associated hypothetico-deductive intuition in favor of a different
account of confirmation that focuses on deriving instances of a hypothesis. This
is the second grand tradition in confirmation theory. The idea goes back to Jean
Nicod (1925) who modeled ‘l’induction par confirmation’ as the discovery of in-
stances of a hypothesis under test (see also Glymour 1980a). Planet orbits are
instances of Kepler’s laws. Swinging pendula instantiate the harmonic oscilla-
tor. Black ravens instantiate the hypothesis that all ravens are black. Hempel
(1943, 1945/65) provided the first rigorous formalization of this idea by demand-
ing that the evidence entail the development of the hypothesis to the domain of
the evidence. This is quite different from the H-D account where the deductive
arrow goes from the hypothesis to the evidence.
The core of Hempel’s formalization is captured by the satisfaction criterion:
(Hempel) Evidence E (directly) Hempel-confirms hypothesis H rel-
ative to background knowledge K if and only if E.K entails the
development of H for E, that is, the restriction of H to the set of
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singular terms that occur essentially in E.2 Formally, the criterion
amounts to E.K |= H|E .
However, (Hempel) is vulnerable to equally strong, perhaps devastating,
criticism. (Hempel) is monotonous with respect to background knowledge, that
is, the addition of more background knowledge cannot destroy the confirmation
relation. This can lead to disastrous consequences. Consider the hypothesis
H = ∀x : (Rx→ Bx) that all ravens are black, and the evidence E = ¬Ba.¬Ra
that we observe a non-black non-raven. Hempel (1945/65) makes a convincing
case that such a piece of evidence may confirm the raven hypothesis as long
as we do not know beforehand that a is no raven: such observations rule out
potential counterexamples to the raven hypothesis. For instance, if we observe
a grey bird that resembles a raven, then finding out that it was a crow confirms
the raven hypothesis.
However, Hempel’s own account of confirmation is inconsistent with this
analysis (Fitelson and Hawthorne 2010): relative to the background knowledge
K = ¬Ra (‘a is no raven’), E.K = ¬Ba.¬Ra implies H|E = (Ra → Ba).
Although the color of birds known to be crows or swans cannot tell us anything
about the truth of the raven hypothesis, E Hempel-confirms H relative to K in
this example, creating an unacceptable confirming instance.
Apart from these difficulties, one may also argue that two different concepts
of confirmation operate in both accounts (Huber 2008, 183–186). While the H-
D account captures tests of informative hypotheses by means of checking their
predictions, the satisfaction criterion (Hempel) is more inductivist in nature: it
generalizes logical entailment from evidence to theory (cf. the set of adequacy
criteria in Hempel 1943, 127–128). To see this more clearly, note that if evidence
E confirms H according to (Hempel), it also confirms any consequence of H.
For the H-D account satisfying CCC, it is precisely the other way round.
Having both properties at the same time leads to a well-known triviality
result that any evidence confirms any hypothesis. So Hempel concluded that
we have to choose between the two approaches. But instead of making such a
choice, I would like to characterize those cases where both approaches agree.
This more restrictive synthetic account may then be regarded as the core of
qualitative confirmation. To this end, the next section introduces a logical tool:
content parts.
2Definition 2 will make this notion precise; see Hempel (1943) for the original definition.
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4. Content Parts
The source of the problem of irrelevant disjunction is the property of first-order
logic that well-formed forms (wffs) sometimes have irrelevant consequences: for
instance, the conclusion in Fa |= (Fa ∨ Ga) contains the irrelevant element
Ga. We need a logical relation different from standard deductive entailment
in order to discern irrelevant disjuncts. For the sake of simplicity, I presup-
pose a first order predicate language L without identity, but the extensions are
straightforward.3
Ken Gemes’ (1993) account of content parts achieves that goal by analyzing
relevance relations between wffs. The following definition captures an intuitive
view of relevance relations between two wffs:
Definition 1 An atomic well-formed form (wff) β is relevant to a wff α if and
only if there is some model M of α such that: if M ′ differs from M only in the
value β is assigned, M ′ is not a model of α.
Intuitively, β is relevant for α if in at least in one model of α the truth value
of β cannot be changed without making α false. In other words, the truth value
of α is not fully independent of the truth value of β. A particularly interesting
application of this account of relevance is the notion of the domain and the
development of a wff.
Definition 2 The domain of a well-formed formula α is the set of singular
terms that occur in the atomic wffs that are relevant for α. The development of
a universally quantified wff α for another wff β, written α|β, is the restriction
of α to the domain of β, that is, we evaluate the truth value of α with respect
to the domain of β.
For instance, the domain of Fa.Fb is {a, b} whereas the domain of Fa.Ga is
{a}, and the development of ∀x : Fx for Fa.¬Gb is Fa.Fb.
Moreover, we can define the notion of a relevant model which assigns truth
values to all and only the relevant atomic wffs:
Definition 3 A relevant model of a wff α is a model of α that assigns truth
values to all and only those atomic wffs that are relevant to α.
So relevant models remain silent on the truth values of irrelevant atomic
wffs. This allows us to define the notion of a content part, where in addition
3A generalization of the content part relation to richer languages that can be used for H-D
confirmation, e.g. languages with identity, is given in Gemes (1997).
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to logical entailment, all relevant models of the consequens can be extended to
relevant models of the antecedens:
Definition 4 For two wffs α and β, β is a content part of α (α |=cp β) if
and only if (1) α and β are contingent, (2) α logically entails β and (3) every
relevant model of β has an extension which is a relevant model of α.
The content part relation forbids irrelevant disjunctions in the conclusion.
For instance, Fa ∨Ga is no content part of Fa because the model that assigns
‘false’ to Fa and ‘true’ to Ga is a relevant model of Fa ∨Ga, but no model of
Fa. The content part relation marks such deductions as irrelevant. Following
Gemes (1993), we can improve on our original definition of H-D confirmation
by postulating
(H-D*) Evidence E H-D confirms hypothesis H relative to back-
ground knowledge K if and only if (1) H.K is consistent, (2) E is a
content part of H.K (H.K |=cp E) and (3) K alone does not entail
E.
5. Synthesizing Hempelian and H-D confirmation
Unfortunately, (H-D*) does not solve all tacking paradoxes: the problem of
irrelevant conjunctions persists. Observations of a swinging pendulum still con-
firm the hypothesis that pendula are harmonic oscillators and that all ravens
are black. To rule out these problems, Gemes (1993) has introduced ‘natural
axiomatizations’ of a theory.
That strategy has its merits, but also its drawbacks (Schurz 2005). First, it
is not always clear which axiomatizations should count as ‘natural’ and which
not. Second, Gemes’ account ends up with a rather complicated definition and is
hard to interpret intuitively. Keeping in mind Carnap’s (1950, §3) requirement
that explications should be as simple as possible, we might decide to look for
alternatives (e.g., Schurz 1991). Unfortunately, these suggestions also fail to
resolve all examples satisfactorily (Gemes 1998).
Let us return to the problem of irrelevant conjunctions. Hempel noticed
that under certain circumstances, general hypotheses, such as Newton’s Law of
Gravitation, may be confirmed by experimental findings that support a more
specific hypothesis, such as Galileo’s Law. In these cases, ‘the weaker hypothesis
is connected with the stronger one by a logical bond of a particular kind: it is
essentially a substitution instance of the stronger one’ (Hempel 1945/65, 32, my
emphasis).
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Indeed, the tacking problem emerges because the evidence is only a partial
instance of the tacked hypothesis: Fa is no instance of H = ∀x : (Fx.Gx), etc.
To cure this problem without losing the H-D spirit of the confirmation relation,
I suggest that the negation of the hypothesis, suitably restricted, be a content
part of the negation of the evidence. By this move, we can discern evidence
which is no instance of the compound hypothesis, such as Hempel’s example of
the raven and Hooke’s law. Formally, the condition reads
¬E.K |=cp ¬H|E .K. (1)
Here, ‘H|E ’ refers to the development of H for the domain of E – that is, the
set of singular terms that are relevant to E. Now, if H is the compound of a
‘relevant’ and an ‘irrelevant’ hypothesis, then the content part relation will not
hold between ¬E.K and ¬H|E .K, because the irrelevant conjunctions have been
transformed into irrelevant disjunctions. For example, if H = ∀x : (Fx.Gx),
E = Fa, and K = >, then ¬H|E .K = ¬Fa ∨ ¬Ga is no content part of
¬E.K = ¬Fa.
Hence, we can use (1) in a definition of qualitative confirmation that synthe-
sizes Hempelian and H-D confirmation. Evidence should consist of predictions
of H which form at the same time instances of H:
(Syn) Evidence E confirms hypothesis H relative to background
knowledge K if and only if
• E is a content part of H.K (H.K |=cp E), and
• ¬H|E .K is a content part of ¬E.K (¬E.K |=cp ¬H|E .K).
(Syn) successfully copes with the tacking paradoxes, and in doing so, it
improves upon classical H-D confirmation as well as upon Hempel’s proposal.
For instance, in the raven paradox, (Syn) goes with the H-D account: E =
Ra.Ba does not directly confirm H = ∀x : (Rx→ Bx), but both E1 = Ba and
E2 = ¬Ra confirmH relative toK1 = Ra andK2 = ¬Ba, respectively. Notably,
H is no longer confirmable by known non-ravens whose color is subsequently
observed, as it used to be the case in Hempel’s own account.
However, (Syn) does not explain how different parts of a theory can be con-
firmed by a body of composite evidence. This feature of (Syn) is particularly
salient if we examine the behavior of that account with respect to the confirma-
tion of several hypotheses at once. Assume that a biologist conducts a couple
of experiments with a cell culture. Unfortunately, she can use each cell only
once, that is, for one experiment. Reasonably, she partitions the cell culture
9
into different groups and performs experiment A with group 1, experiment B
with group 2, and so on. If the experiments are successful, they should, taken
together, confirm the conjunction of the hypotheses. In other words, if E1 con-
firms H1 and E2 confirms H2 for suitably independent pieces of evidence, then
E1.E2 should also confirm H1.H2.
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Unfortunately, (Syn) violates this desideratum. For instance, E = Fa.Gb
will not confirm the hypothesis H = ∀x : (Fx.Gx) relative to K = >. Thus,
while (Syn) synthesizes Hempelian and H-D confirmation, we lack an extension
where the confirmation of independent hypotheses can add up to the confirma-
tion of an entire theory which is composed of the former.
5. An Extension to Theory Confirmation
For extending (Syn) to the confirmation of entire theories, let us go back to
Hempel once more. For Hempel, a theory is confirmed if it is entailed by a
set of sentences that are individually confirmed by the evidence. Following
this idea, I propose to construct a 1:1-match of theory and evidence: theories
are decomposed into their content parts which are, individually, confirmed by
a specific content part of the evidence. If all content parts of the theory are
confirmed in this way, the entire theory is confirmed. For example, assume
that we would like to confirm Kepler’s Three Laws by means of observing the
planetary orbits in the solar system. Then we use the position of a single planet
at different points in time to confirm the first two laws, whereas we require data
about the orbital period and the semi-major axis of at least two different planets
in order to confirm the Third Law.
In other words, I stipulate that evidence E confirms a theory T if (i) E is
a content part of T (relative to background knowledge K), and (ii) there is a
decomposition of T into content parts H1, . . . ,Hn such that for each Hi, the
evidence contains an instance of Hi.
This line of reasoning is condensed in the following definition:
(SynT) Evidence E confirms theory T relative to background
knowledge K if and only if
• E is a content part of T.K (T.K |=cp E)
• There are wffs H1, . . . ,Hn such that H1, . . . ,Hn |= T and for
all i ≤ n, T |=cp Hi, and there is a wff Ei such that
– E |=cp Ei
4This example is due to Ken Gemes.
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– ¬Ei.K |=cp (¬Hi)|Ei .K, that is, (¬Hi)|Ei .K is a content
part of ¬Ei.K.
To illustrate how (SynT) works, consider a medical trial. We would like
to test the theory T that only plasmodium parasites cause malaria in hu-
mans. More precisely, the theory consists of the individual hypotheses H1, H2,
H3, etc. that only plasmodium parasites cause the different forms of malaria
M1, M2, M3. We test these hypotheses by scrutinizing patients that have
been suffering from malaria, sorting them into subtrials according to the kind
of malaria Mi. If the individual trials confirm the hypothesis (T.K |=cp E,
¬Ei.K |=cp (¬Hi)|Ei .K), then we have also confirmed our overarching theory,
since the evidence of each trial Ei is a content part of the total evidence. Fur-
thermore, (SynT) solves our biologist’s problem: if two different properties (F
and G) are supposed to be demonstrated of a population, we can decompose the
composite hypothesis ∀x : Fx.Gx into its content parts ∀x : Fx and ∀x : Gx,
each of which is confirmed by a content part of the evidence (Fa and Gb).
Summing up, (SynT) has a number of desirable implications. It solves the
tacking paradoxes, gives an account of how entire theories can be confirmed in
a piecemeal fashion, and does so using only a single technical concept: content
part entailment, a refinement of deductive entailment. A fortiori, we can also
apply it to the confirmation of single hypotheses.
6. Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, I have synthesized Hempelian and H-D confirmation, that is, con-
firmation by instances and confirmation by successful predictions. I contend
that the reputation of qualitative confirmation as either hopeless or outdated
is unjustified: it can be defended against the prevalent objections. The main
competitor on the quantitative side – Bayesianism – is an attractive framework
for modeling learning under uncertainty, but, as argued in section 2, it misses
the structure of logical relations between theory and evidence. Since these rela-
tions often matter for a better understanding of scientific evidence and scientific
argumentation, qualitative accounts should not be dismissed out of hand.
Building on earlier work by Gemes and an intuition by Hempel, this paper
proposes a new account of qualitative confirmation: (SynT). This new account
solves the tacking paradoxes and covers the confirmation of entire theories.
However, not all consequences may be judged desirable.
For instance, the confirmation of existential statements remains difficult.
One might also object that our account is limited to theories with purely ob-
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servational content: since the evidence must be stated in terms of observational
properties, it is hard to see how ¬H|E (that may refer to unobservable proper-
ties) can ever be a content part of ¬E. For instance, suppose that an electron
is shot into an electromagnetic field. It will then experience a Lorentz force and
change its direction accordingly. Then, ¬H|E seems to be a disjunction of an
observable and a non-observable proposition. So it cannot be a content part of
the (purely observational) ¬E.
However, if the electron experiences an electromagnetic force, it will be de-
flected orthogonally to its original direction and to the electromagnetic force
lines. This follows directly from the formula for the Lorentz force ~F = q (~v× ~B).
Conversely, if the electron fails to move in that direction, we can infer that there
cannot have been an (unobservable) Lorentz force, and we can infer ¬H|E from
¬E. Thus, the proposal also applies to theories with partly unobservable con-
tent.
A consequence of the hybrid character of the account is that H = ∀x, y :
Rxy is not confirmed by Rab relative to tautologous background knowledge
because Rab does not constitute a full instance of H. For that, we would
require to observe Raa, Rba, and Rbb as well. Similarly, hypotheses without
finite models cannot be confirmed. This property differs from classical accounts
of H-D confirmation such as Gemes (1993) and shows that the new account
is more restrictive than H-D confirmation. However, since (SynT) is a merger
of two traditions, this is not too surprising. It captures the idea that there is
a core concept of qualitative confirmation that can be extended into different
directions (confirmation by instances, or H-D confirmation). In this sense, I
concur with Gemes (1998, 8) that for accounts of confirmation, ‘it is better to
be too exclusive than too inclusive’. But perhaps, (SynT) can be extended as
to include those cases as well.
On the whole, (SynT) is simpler and more straightforward than the rivalling
suggestions of Gemes (1993) and Schurz (1991), and it gives a satisfactory treat-
ment of paradigmatic problems such as the tacking paradoxes, the raven para-
dox, and the confirmation of entire theories. Thus, it is explained how successful
predictions and instances of a hypothesis can both matter for the confirmation
of a theory, while at the same time solving the classical paradoxes and modeling
the piecemeal confirmation of entire theories. That such a synthesis is possible
might help to explain why philosophers such as Hempel and Glymour searched
for a single account of qualitative confirmation, rather than disentangling both
approaches.
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All this does not imply that (SynT) is entirely unproblematic, and I have
also mentioned potentially worrisome examples. But first, none of these exam-
ples is clear and conclusive enough to be a refutation of (SynT). Second, all
available qualitative accounts of confirmation have to struggle with some intu-
itively odd implications and the charge of incompleteness.5 Third, bringing an
account in line with all our intuitions usually comes at the expense of simplicity,
transparency and conceptual parsimony, as visible in the proposals by Gemes
and Schurz. Given that (SynT) is so much simpler than the best proposals in
the literature, I conclude that it adds considerable value to our theorizing about
qualitative confirmation.
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